By Angelo A. Camillo, PhD, MBA, October 2026 — Strategy & Industry Analysis

October 7, 2026 (Wine Business Institute, Sonoma State University) — The global wine industry is living through the same storm, but its companies are not ending up in the same place. In May 2026, the International Organisation of Vine and Wine (OIV) reported that world wine consumption fell 2.7% in 2025 to 208 million hectoliters, the lowest level since 1957. Exports fell to their lowest volume since 2009. Nine of the ten largest wine markets shrank.
Yet in that same environment, some companies posted record premium sales, raised dividends, and bought prestige assets. Others wrote off billions or disappeared altogether. The question every winery owner, investor, and board should be asking is not whether the market is difficult. It is why the same difficult market produces such different outcomes.
In my June article for Wine Industry Advisor, I argued that artificial intelligence is following the dot-com pattern toward rapid consolidation, and that proprietary data would become the real competitive moat. This article takes the next step. It asks which wine companies will be on the right side of that consolidation — and it answers by revisiting a question I studied nearly two decades ago in a very different setting: Bay Area restaurants.
Same storm, different outcomes: wine’s winners and losers are increasingly separated not by vineyard acreage or case volume, but by management judgment, brand clarity, and the capacity to learn faster than the market changes.
From Restaurants to Wineries: The Northern California Lens
Failure is rarely caused by the market alone; it is usually caused by how management responds to the market. That was the central finding of Success and Failure in Northern California: Critical Success Factors for Independent Restaurants, which my co-authors Daniel Connolly, Woo Gon Kim, and I published in Cornell Hospitality Quarterly in 2008.
We followed nine successful and nine failed independent restaurants in the San Francisco Bay Area between 2003 and 2007. Each faced the same rents, the same labor market, and the same diners. Those external conditions did not explain the failures. They were explained by internal factors — above all, owner overconfidence and what we called emotional unfitness: the inability to separate personal passion from business judgment. Success, by contrast, came only when several factors worked in harmony: a clearly defined concept, disciplined management, the right stakeholders, and an honest reading of the operating environment.
After years of teaching and researching wine business, I am convinced that the same framework explains today’s wine industry — only at a larger scale and with larger numbers. A winery is, after all, an agricultural operation, a manufacturing plant, a consumer brand, and a hospitality business. It inherits every failure mode of a restaurant and adds a few of its own:
- Overconfidence becomes paying peak prices for acquisitions on the assumption that growth will continue.
- Emotional unfitness becomes holding on to a founder’s brand, a vineyard, or a price tier long after the market has moved.
- An unclear concept becomes a portfolio of dozens of brands with no clear reason to exist side by side.
- Informal, instinct-driven management becomes making vintage, inventory, and pricing decisions on instinct rather than data.
The international benchmark below shows how closely the world’s leading wine companies track this pattern.
The International Benchmark: Ten Companies, Four Continents
Across ten of the world’s leading wine companies, one pattern stands out: the strongest performers over the past years shifted investment toward premium brands and customer relationships, and away from commodity volume. The companies that underperformed did so not because they ignored that strategy, but because they executed it at the wrong price or the wrong time. The lesson is clear: strategic success depends as much on the accuracy of scenario planning as on the strategy itself. Companies that based critical decisions on flawed pessimistic, optimistic, or most-likely assumptions frequently found themselves out of step with market realities, undermining performance and shareholder value.
| Company | Base | Strategic posture | Recent defining move | Outcome so far |
| E. & J. Gallo | USA | Scale plus luxury tier | Bought Hahn Family Wines and Rombauer Vineyards (2023), adding 700+ Napa and Sonoma acres | Remains the largest U.S. wine marketer; luxury group keeps acquired teams in place |
| The Wine Group | USA | Scale and operational efficiency | Acquired Woodbridge, Meiomi, Cook’s, SIMI and others from Constellation (June 2025) | Became the consolidator of mainstream wine as others exited |
| Constellation Brands | USA | Margin over volume | Sold its mainstream wines; kept a portfolio priced mostly at $15 and above | A deliberate retreat to premium; wine and spirits sales still declined |
| Treasury Wine Estates | Australia | Luxury focus | Paid up to US$1 billion for DAOU (Dec 2023) | FY26 statutory loss of A$1.08 billion after U.S. write-downs; Penfolds still earns a ~40% margin |
| Vinarchy | Australia | Consolidation platform | Merged Accolade with Pernod Ricard’s Australian, NZ and Spanish wines (2025) | New specialist with A$1.5B+ in revenue; integration still underway |
| Pernod Ricard | France | Portfolio optimization | Sold its Australian, New Zealand and Spanish wine businesses (2025) | Seller, not buyer, in the consolidation cycle |
| Concha y Toro | Chile | Premium exports | Grew 2025 revenue 1.7%; premium and above reached 57.4% of wine sales; bought a majority of Provence’s Maison Mirabeau | Resilient: Don Melchor sales up 84.6%, dividend payout raised |
| Castel Frères | France | Export and geographic reach | Broad international distribution and multi-country production | Scale with geographic diversification |
| Jackson Family Wines | USA | Luxury plus sustainability | Multi-region vineyard ownership on several continents | Climate resilience as a long-term asset |
| Trinchero Family Estates | USA | Brand portfolio growth | Ongoing brand acquisitions across price tiers | Portfolio diversity across segments |
Two lessons emerge. First, the same strategy produced different results depending on discipline and timing. Gallo, Treasury, and The Wine Group all grew by acquisition; their outcomes diverged sharply. Second, the companies that are holding up best — Concha y Toro is the clearest example — combine premiumization with vertical integration and broad market diversification, so that weakness in one market is offset by strength in another.
What the Winners Share
The companies holding their ground share five characteristics, and none of them is size alone.
- A clear concept for every brand. Restaurant research has long found that failed owners describe their concept only as “the food.” In wine, the equivalent is a brand defined only by the grape. Winners can say who each brand is for, at what price, and why it deserves a place in the portfolio. Constellation’s decision to keep only brands priced mostly at $15 and above is, at bottom, a decision about concept clarity.
- Premium positioning before volume. The OIV itself notes that the industry has long offset falling volume with rising value. Concha y Toro’s 2025 results illustrate the point: flat volume, rising wine sales, and a luxury label growing by more than 80%.
- Owned customer relationships. Wine clubs, tasting rooms, hospitality, and direct-to-consumer sales generate higher margins and, more importantly, data. A company that knows its customers can adjust faster than one that learns about demand from distributor reports months later.
- Geographic and channel diversification. Owning vineyards and markets across regions protects against frost, fire, heat, tariffs, and the collapse of a single market. Concha y Toro’s growth in China and the UK offset declines elsewhere in Asia.
- Patient, unemotional capital. Family-controlled companies such as Gallo and Jackson Family Wines can wait out cycles. That patience is a strategic asset — provided it is paired with the discipline to walk away from a deal or a brand that no longer fits.
Winners do not avoid risk. They take it in places where they have a clear concept, real customer insight, and the patience to wait.
What the Failures Share
The most instructive recent failures in wine are not small family wineries that ran out of money. They are well-capitalized companies that followed the textbook growth strategy — and still failed. Two cases make the point.
Vintage Wine Estates: the roll-up that never became a company
Vintage Wine Estates was assembled through rapid acquisitions into one of the largest U.S. wine groups, with more than 30 brands, 11 wineries, and nine tasting rooms. In July 2024, it filed for Chapter 11, carrying about $310 million in secured debt. Its brands were sold off piece by piece for roughly $158 million, and a liquidation plan took effect in February 2025. In its own filings, the company pointed to weaker demand, the difficulty of integrating its many acquisitions, and litigation.
Read through the Northern California lens, this is a textbook case of an unclear concept at scale. Thirty brands were acquired; one coherent company was never built. The roll-up strategy recommended in many growth playbooks — buy several wineries, combine them on one platform — works only when integration is treated as the main event, not an afterthought.
Treasury Wine Estates and DAOU: the right asset at the wrong price
Treasury Wine Estates closed its purchase of Paso Robles’ DAOU Vineyards in December 2023 for up to US$1 billion. At the time, DAOU was the fastest-growing luxury brand in U.S. trade, and the strategic logic was widely praised. Less than three years later, Treasury reported a statutory net loss of A$1.08 billion for fiscal 2026, driven by A$866 million in impairments of U.S. brands, goodwill, and inventory, and a decision to cut U.S. vintage intake from 2026. Penfolds, the company’s heritage icon brand, still delivered a margin of about 40%.
The lesson is not that luxury acquisitions are a mistake. It is that growth assumptions priced into a deal at the top of a cycle are a form of overconfidence — the same failure factor we found in Bay Area dining rooms in 2007. Penfolds, a brand built over more than 180 years, held its value; the growth Treasury bought did not, at least on its original schedule.
Scale, capital, and the right strategy on paper did not protect either company. Execution, integration, and humility about the cycle decided the outcome.
Super AI: The New Dividing Line
In the era of Super AI — increasingly capable, general-purpose AI systems that can reason over a company’s entire operation — the old success factors do not disappear; they become measurable. Every failure factor in the Northern California framework now has a data-driven counterweight, and the companies that use it will widen their lead.
| Failure factor | How it shows up in wine today | What AI changes |
| Overconfidence | Paying peak prices on optimistic growth curves | Stress-testing acquisitions against dozens of demand, tariff, and climate scenarios before signing |
| Emotional unfitness | Keeping a brand, vineyard, or price tier for sentimental reasons | Brand-level profitability and depletion data that make the case for change visible to the whole board |
| Unclear concept | Portfolios of overlapping brands with no distinct customer | Consumer and purchase data that show who actually buys each brand, and why |
| Weak integration | Acquired brands running on separate systems and teams | One data layer across vineyards, cellar, inventory, and direct-to-consumer sales |
| Reading the environment late | Learning about demand from distributor reports months after the fact | Near-real-time demand sensing from club, e-commerce, and depletion data |
There is an important caution. As I noted in June, research from Columbia Business School finds that adopting AI is not, by itself, a competitive advantage: when every competitor uses the same tools, the tools stop differentiating anyone. The advantage belongs to companies with proprietary data — vineyard histories, cellar records, and above all their own customer relationships — that make shared AI tools far more effective for them than for anyone else.
This is why the winners’ playbook and the AI playbook converge. Owned customer relationships, a clear brand concept, and integrated operations are exactly the conditions under which AI pays off. A roll-up of 30 disconnected brands, by contrast, gives AI nothing coherent to learn from.
In the era of Super AI, I am confident the gap between wine’s winners and losers will be set less by who owns the most vineyards and more by who owns the most useful knowledge about their own business and customers.
The Strategic Conclusion: Six Lessons for Winery Owners
The wine companies that will lead the next decade will not be those that produce the most wine. They will be those that make the fewest unforced errors in a shrinking market and learn faster than their competitors. Six lessons follow from the benchmark.
- Define the concept before you scale it. Every brand needs a clear customer, price position, and reason to exist. If it cannot be stated in one sentence, it is a candidate for divestment, not investment.
- Build premium value and direct relationships early. Club members, hospitality guests, and direct buyers are the source of both margin and the proprietary data that AI turns into advantage.
- Buy with discipline and integrate as if the deal depends on it — because it does. Acquisitions accelerate growth only when the purchase price assumes a realistic cycle and integration is planned before closing.
- Diversify against climate, tariffs, and single-market risk. Multi-region sourcing and multi-market sales turn local shocks into manageable variations.
- Measure success by enterprise value and customer lifetime value, not cases/hectoliters. Volume is the metric of the industry that is disappearing; value is the metric of the one that is emerging.
- Lead change instead of reacting to it. Management scholar Peter Drucker warned that “one cannot manage change. One can only be ahead of it.” In wine, being ahead means reading consumption, climate, and AI trends before they show up in depletion reports — and repositioning brands, vineyards, and channels while there is still time and capital to do so. The companies in this benchmark that struggled were mostly reacting; the ones holding their ground had moved first.
Nearly twenty years ago, the Bay Area restaurants that failed did not lack passion or good food. They lacked the discipline to let evidence override instinct. The wine industry now has access to more evidence than any restaurateur in 2007 could have imagined. Whether that evidence is used will decide which wine companies succeed in the era of Super AI — and which become the next case study.
Sources
This AI-assisted analysis is compiled from the author’s own desk and field research and from company disclosures, regulatory filings, and industry reporting. All data reflects information available through early October 2026. The validity and reliability of the secondary data rest with the sources from which it was obtained.
- Camillo, A. A., Connolly, D. J., & Kim, W. G. (2008). Success and Failure in Northern California: Critical Success Factors for Independent Restaurants. Cornell Hospitality Quarterly, 49(4), 364–380.
- Camillo, A. A. (2026, June 1). The AI Revolution: From Silicon Valley to the Vineyard. Wine Industry Advisor.
- Drucker, P. F. (1999). Management Challenges for the 21st Century. Harper Business.
- OIV, State of the World Wine Sector 2025, as reported by Reuters via Hospitality Ireland and Just Drinks (May 2026).
- Wine Spectator, Gallo Buys Rombauer Vineyards (2023).
- Constellation Brands, Form 8-K: closing of wine transaction with The Wine Group (June 2, 2025).
- Shanken News Daily, Treasury Wine Estates Closes $1 Billion Deal for Daou Vineyards (Dec. 15, 2023).
- Food & Drink Business, TWE massive loss precedes a successful ascent (FY26 results, 2026).
- WBM Online, Vinarchy is born after Accolade-Pernod merger (2025).
- Vino Joy News, Concha y Toro posts modest growth in 2025 (March 2026); Vinetur, Concha y Toro raises dividend payout (March 2026).
Jones Day, Vintage Wine Estates Chapter 11 case summary; Chapter11Cases, VWE disclosure statement.
Angelo A. Camillo, PhD, MBA, is an Associate Professor of Management at the Wine Business Institute in the School of Business at Sonoma State University in Rohnert Park, California, in the heart of the Wine Country. He is the author of six books and the forthcoming book “Winery Hospitality Management: Strategies for the Global Wine Experience Economy” (Ethics Press), also available on Amazon and Barnes & Noble.
Dr. Camillo’s interdisciplinary research encompasses international business, competitive advantage, innovation, strategy, and technology across industries, with a focus on hospitality and the wine business in Europe, Australasia, and North America.
Dr. Camillo can be reached at camillo@sonoma.edu, https://business.sonoma.edu/about/faculty/angelo-camillo-phd